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I'm not sure, but it can not be defined by ones ablities, because this leads to random stripping and slashing of rights of "non-person humans".

If we are to agree that our race is somehow superior than others on our planet, there must be some inhearant reason why. Mere functionality does not fit. We can say that it is because we "have the capacity for higher reason" but some "persons" do not. We can say that it is because we have self awareness, but this too excludes certain "persons". When personhood becomes defined by "what we can do" rather than "who we are" we begin charting on dangerous territory. If one wishes to argue that even those "people" who do not meet the qualifications of "person" are still "persons" due to their born status, we create a classification of "non-person humans" that is unique only to the unborn. If the non critera meeting persons are "persons" do to their nature of being of our race, why then our fetuses excluded.

Also, you say you disagree that functional arguments do not place fetuses and infants on the same level, do you care to elaborate?

There is obviously going to be some overhanging where some fetuses will qualify as well as infants because the process from conception to birth is transitional and if personhood isn't transitional then there will be a blurry area near wherever we draw the line, however there can be distinctions made that separate fetuses at the time of legal abortion and newborns. You may disagree with the arguments, the premises, and such... but arguments are able to be made. I don't really plan on defending these arguments... I'm just making them quickly to show that they could, in fact, exist.

Well first is the arbitrary way out: If we define personhood as starting at the time of birth. Personhood would be defined as having passed out of the womb and into the world. This would include infants, but not fetuses. Obviously you object because it is arbitrary, but it is the most obvious case where one is able to define personhood based on a function (granted, not a function provided by the fetus, but a function none-the-less) to include infants and not fetuses. (Hey, you never said it couldn't be arbitrary ;P )


The second way one could define personhood as the point in which one has acquired the ability to sustain his or her own being without the direct bodily assistance of another for a majority of bodily functions. I.E. if you are able to breath on your own, have your own heart beat for you, have your own kidneys and liver clean your system, have your own stomach digest for you then you are an independent human individual and have thus achieved personhood. One could object to this where issues of iron lungs, dialysis machines, and pacemakers come into play (It is possible to think of a person who has nearly all organs failing, yet while on machines is still considered a person). One who is pro-choice would have to distinguish between partial independence where one or two organs fail, and a complete lack of independence where almost all organs require someone else's or something else's assistance, and explain why a born person with near total-organ failure was still a person, but a fetus with near total organ failure was not.

However, if we presume that a pro-choicer made a satisfying argument for this then an early term fetus would not be included, a late term (healthy) fetus and a neonate would be... because even though they may require someone to feed them, their organs sustain their own beings whereas an early term fetus' does not. Of course, this is working under the assumption that such a satisfying argument could be provided. But again, all you asked for was an argument ;p

A third way which one could make the classification is to base it on brain functions. This again would cause some overlap with late term fetuses... but one could argue it anyway. If we made it "consciousness" then early term fetuses would not have it. If we are to believe one of the articles linked in the first page of the abortion debate... than even late term fetuses do not have it (due to a lack of oxygen in the brain to support "awakeness" and consciousness)... however newborns would have this. Whether or not consciousness is a decent argument aside... it's an argument that could be made.

A fourth way that would include late-term fetuses would be to say "an ability for consciousness." That is to say that if oxygen were present in enough quantities would the fetus if removed from the womb have this ability just as a newborn does? This is different from above because above says that consciousness has already been obtained, this one says that consciousness could be obtained under the proper circumstances at this moment. This would again exclude early term fetuses, and would include late term fetuses, but it would definately create a distinction between the vast majority of fetuses at the typical time of abortion (first 16 weeks) and a newborn.

Broorel... then perhaps a distinction between a late term fetus and a neonate is not needed? Some arguments based on functionality can be made (like I said, birth and sustaining consciousness/awakeness) even if they aren't really that great.

Perhaps then we can consider late term fetuses persons as well as neonates. I mean is there any reason we should aim to make the distinction between them?

The fact that functionality distinctions would not differentiate between late term fetuses and neonates under many circumstances doesn't seem to pose much of a problem to the abortion debate since most people would argue that abortions ought not be permitted in the late term anyway (with exceptions for life threatening scenarios or where the fetus will not be born alive)... So does the fault of functionality to differentiate between neonates and late term fetuses really pose a problem in the abortion debate in and of itself (for surely there are other problems we can present, such as how to tell when such functions have truly been obtained... but if we were looking to qualify personhood only)?

I think the "right to control her DNA" is rather ambiguous. She has as much of a right to control her DNA as the father has a right to control his. When pregnant his DNA is inside of her... but he does not get a choice because it is her body doing the whole pregnancy thing. Also it is important to remember that it is only 50% her DNA, and ultimately it is unique DNA not hers or the father's but a mixture of both.

I've yet to hear a truly convincing argument against artificial wombs based solely on control over DNA.

The best I've heard of is that "if it is not yet a person, why does it matter if it is killed even if an alternative is available?"

That makes sense. If personhood is granted upon birth, then abortion up until any point should be fine. If it's granted before birth, though, it gets ambiguous. At what point in developement does a human become a person? First thought? First sound heard? First sight? First taste? If artificial wombs come into play, a first trimester fetus will be just as viable as an early third term fetus. There will be a way to sustain life outside of the womb. So personhood isn't based on viability, because if it was, there would be no debate over artificial wombs. A fetus would be viable first trimester and therefore would be a person. You could argue functionality I suppose, but a fetus functions the way a fetus is supposed to function, the same way as a baby functions the way a baby is supposed to.

I'd also like to know why we drop, "Rather safe than sorry." There is the potential that 30million+ people are killed worldwide each year, but we're letting it happen because we can't decide if they're people or not? If it turns out they are, do we say, "Oops, sorry, we recklessly judged you a nonperson even though it turns out you are. Well, you're dead now so you can't even hear me talking to you, but just know that your death wasn't really in vain, since, you know, you might not have been a person after all."

Exactly.

If that were to happen, would that mean that fetii before that point weren't persons? That'd sorta be like saying slaves weren't persons until they were declared persons. That's not the case. They were always people, they just weren't legally recognized as such until later. It doesn't change the fact that all those people suffered due to the actions taken against them when they were legally non-persons. If viability determines personhood and eventually due to artificial wombs even a first trimester fetus can be viable, that would mean that fetii were always people.

They are as viable as people kept alive by iron lungs or IV lines.

But I don't understand; What is another functionality used to define humanity? I thought that we decided viability was the only one that properly seperated born infants from fetuses. Which, by the way, I find an interesting thing; That you aren't starting at, "People are -blank-, so fetuses are not people." but rather, "Fetuses aren't people, so people are -blank-." Making the reasoning to fit the conclusion. That sounds like rather emotional reasoning to me.

Human DNA is undesputed in fetuses, and human thought is unprovable; Though many would say that a brain must be functional for human thought to be available, that's conjecture and not proven.

As for "animals are viable too," we have a cruelty to animals law. Killing an animal that is doing you no wrong for no particular reason (food being included as a reason, of course) is definitely looked down upon, and in many cases is illegal. So if you can transfer a fetus out of your womb, getting rid of the "wrong" it is doing you, and it still be alive, wouldn't it be cruel to kill it? Even if you don't view it as a person? Shouldn't it even be above animals on the "value" measuring stick? Since it will be a person eventually if left alone.

Going a little off-topic: That statement really makes no sense to me. "It will be a human person, but it isn't now." The only thing that works that way. An animal fetus is fully that animal, because animals aren't people. But human fetuses aren't fully human, even though humans are people. What is it precluding personhood? Not fully human? Inhuman? Bah.

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